We study a setting where agents use no-regret learning algorithms to participate in repeated auctions. Recently, Kolumbus and Nisan [2022a] showed, rather surprisingly, that when bidders participate in second-price auctions using no-regret bidding algorithms, no matter how large the number of interactions $T$ is, the runner-up bidder may not converge to bidding truthfully. Our first result shows that this holds forall deterministictruthful auctions. We also show that the ratio of the learning rates of different bidders can qualitatively affect the convergence of the bidders. Next, we consider the problem of revenue maximization in this environment. In the setting with fully rational bidders, the seminal result of Myerson [1981] showed that revenue can be maximized by using a second-price auction with reserves.

We consider online bandit learning in which at every time step, an algorithm has to make a decision and then observe only its reward. The goal is to design efficient (polynomial-time) algorithms that achieve a total reward approximately close to that of the best fixed decision in hindsight. In this paper, we introduce a new notion of $(\lambda,\mu)$-concave functions and present a bandit learning algorithm that achieves a performance guarantee which is characterized as a function of the concavity parameters $\lambda$ and $\mu$. The algorithm is based on the mirror descent algorithm in which the update directions follow the gradient of the multilinear extensions of the reward functions. The regret bound induced by our algorithm is $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ which is nearly optimal.

So, the above multiplicative requirement is too strong to hold in general.

Increasingly, copious amounts of consumer data are used to learn high-revenue mechanisms via machine learning. Existing research on mechanism design via machine learning assumes that there is a distribution over the buyers' values for

On the construction of almost uniformly convergent random variables with given weakly convergent image laws.

This paper investigates how many samples are needed from buyers'

On the construction of almost uniformly convergent random variables with given weakly convergent image laws.